Abstract
Introduction

1
Oil prices took a dramatic plunge starting in late-2014 and have remained low ever since. Combined 2 with parallel developments in natural gas supply, this plunge has prompted questions regarding what 3 the "new normal" might mean for global markets. How will falling oil and gas prices affect energy 4 decision-making over the long term? Will they damage the business case for renewables? Will they 5 stymie incentives to invest in energy efficiency? How do they change the outlook for coal and 6 nuclear? Does this spell bad news for efforts to mitigate climate change? The International Energy 7 Agency (IEA) recently found that, between now and 2040, lower oil prices will lead to marginally 8 greater oil and gas demand and incrementally smaller renewables and coal demand, which on 9 balance means slightly higher carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 1 . It is not unlikely that the energy and 10 emissions impacts could be larger than this, however. What is more, the broader, energy system-11 wide impacts of diverging oil price futures are likely to depend on a number of key uncertainties.
13
Here we present work that unpicks several potentially influential factors, thereby going beyond the net CO2 emissions differences we find are not larger (or smaller) when oil prices either rise or fall 26 is because of (i) parallel responses seen for carbon-intensive coal and low-carbon biomass (i.e., their 27 benefits/consequences partially cancel out), and (ii) price-induced energy service demand responses 28 across the end-use sectors (industry, transport, and buildings). Thus, if the goal is to mitigate carbon 29 substantially, high oil prices offer no substitute for climate policies. Whether or not oil and gas
30
prices decouple going forward is found to be the biggest uncertainty influencing the system-wide 31 effects exhibited by our scenarios. The impacts also strongly depend on uncertainties surrounding 32 the future potential of sustainable bioenergy supplies and the costs and availability/scalability of 33 electric vehicles. In short, the energy and CO2 impacts of diverging oil price futures depend not just 34 on prices alone, but rather on a number of uncertain resource-, technology-, and policy-related 35 factors.
37
Confronting uncertainties in oil prices and related factors 38 Given the importance of crude oil and natural gas in today's energy system, the prices of these two 39 fossil resources -both their current levels and future expectations -are determining factors in 40 technology and fuel choice decisions throughout the economy (e.g., transport, petro-chemicals, 41 manufacturing, power generation, and building heating and cooling, among others (2) Biofuels production costs and availability/scalability
Assumes that the fully learned-out investment and operations and maintenance (O&M) costs of the production technologies are 33% lower/higher than in the central case (e.g., 873-1316 US$2005/kW, depending on technology, in the central case). In combination, more optimistic/pessimistic assumptions for the overall market potential of these technologies are made by assuming maximum allowable (annual) diffusion rates that are two %-points higher/lower than in the central case.
(3) Fossil synfuels production costs and availability/scalability
Assumes that the fully learned-out investment and O&M costs of the production technologies are 33% lower/higher than in the central case (e.g., 473-1252 US$2005/kW, depending on technology, in the central case). In combination, more optimistic/pessimistic assumptions for the overall market potential of these technologies are made by assuming maximum allowable (annual) diffusion rates that are two %-points higher/lower than in the central case.
(4) Biofuels & fossil synfuels production costs and availability/scalability Combination of sensitivity cases #2 and 3.
(5) Coupling between oil and natural gas prices
Assumes that oil and natural gas prices fully decouple worldwide in the future (e.g., a 100% change in the oil price results in a 0% change in the gas price, relative to default/intermediate levels). The central case assumption is that gas prices continue to rise and fall in concert with oil prices (100%-to-100%) across all markets, except in the US where only weak correlation is assumed (100%-to-50%).
(6) Electric vehicle costs and availability/scalability Optimistic case assumes that 'behavioral barriers' to advanced vehicle adoption are largely overcome for the bulk of the population (with respect to, for instance, range anxiety, extent of refueling/recharging infrastructure, and risk aversion). For light-duty vehicles in particular, this amounts to an effective cost reduction of US$3,000-15,000 (depending on the year between 2030 and 2050) off the central case vehicle purchase price. We recognize that modeling 'behavioral barriers' as extra cost terms has important indirect resource implications in a general equilibrium context; yet, the aggregate sum of these costs is itself so small (relative to aggregate energy/technology-related costs) as to have no material bearing on the general equilibrium solution.
In addition, assumed upper limits on the maximum contribution of electricity to total transport service demands were relaxed: from 35-50% (depending on the region; in any year to 2100) to 70% (across all regions). Pessimistic case assumes vehicle costs that are higher and maximum contributions that are lower than in the central case (e.g., US$6,000-8,000 cost increase for light-duty vehicles, and a decrease in the total transport contribution from electricity of 35-50% down to 25%). For more details about the modeling of the transport sector in MESSAGE, see ref. 25 .
(7) Natural gas vehicle costs and availability/scalability
Optimistic case assumes an effective cost reduction for light-duty natural gas vehicles of US$3,500-16,500 and an increase in the total transport contribution of natural gas from 10-30% to 70%. Climate policy Assumes varying levels of a globally-harmonized carbon price trajectory, from 0 to 61 US$/tCO2eq in 2030 (central case: 13.5 US$/tCO2eq). Price comes into effect in 2020 and grows with an interest rate of 5%/yr throughout the century. Such carbon pricing in the MESSAGE framework leads to temperatures of between 4.1-4.2 °C and 2.0-2.1 °C (median likelihood) above pre-industrial levels. For reasons of simplicity and consistency (in light of the oil price focus of this paper), we impose carbon pricing via taxes rather than via carbon caps (wherein the carbon price would result from the model endogenously). In the MESSAGE framework, these two carbon pricing mechanisms are synonymous.
1
One set of sensitivities assumes varying levels of stringency for global climate policy -from 2 'baselines' only considering existing policies to more transformative futures where average global 3 temperatures peak at around 2 °C above pre-industrial levels (see Table 1 ). In this context, we note 4 that the mitigation scenario focused upon in this paper is referred to as our 'reference climate policy' 5 storyline. The moderate carbon pricing assumed in this scenario leads to roughly 2.6-2.7 °C warming 6 (median likelihood) above pre-industrial levels by 2100 (with temperatures peaking soon afterwards).
7
The financial signals from carbon pricing and oil pricing impose similar pressure in these scenarios,
8
with neither overly governing the future that unfolds. 9 10 Energy and emission impacts of alternative oil price futures 11 Our scenario exercise leads to several insights with implications for energy-climate policy, 12 technology, and markets. Firstly, sustained low or high oil prices could have a major impact on the 13 global energy mix (i.e., 'substitution effects') between now and 2050 (see Figure 2 , focusing on the 14 results with our central case assumptions, i.e., ignoring the uncertainty ranges for the moment). As 15 expected, low oil prices lead to considerably greater (cumulative) use of oil in both the baseline and 16 climate policy scenarios. Similarly, if natural gas prices remain coupled to oil prices across all regional 17 markets, then the future might also see a similar expansion of gas use in a low oil price world. 
14
Energy demand in the case of no climate policy ('Baseline') and the reference climate policy ('Mitigation') scenarios 15 under low or high oil prices for (a) crude oil, (b) natural gas, (c) low-carbon resources (biomass, non-biomass 16 renewables, and nuclear), and (d) coal. In a,b, crude oil and natural gas are sub-divided into conventional and 17 unconventional resources (e.g., oil sands, shale oil and gas, and tight gas), following the definitions of refs. 16, 27 .
18
Uncertainty ranges are given by the small grey bars of varying shades overlaid along the tops of the main bars. These 
4
These findings regarding fuel substitution dynamics under either low or high oil prices vary across 5 our different supply-and demand-side sensitivity cases. One sees this by noting the uncertainty 6 ranges overlaid along the tops of the bars in Figure 2 (see Supplementary Tables 1 to 4 for numerical 7 details). Eight separate sensitivities are presented (see Table 1 , excluding the climate policy 8 sensitivities); of these, the one leading to the largest variation in our results (i.e., for the different 9 fuels in the various scenarios) is the uncertainty surrounding the future correlation between oil and 10 gas prices (#5). If prices do manage to decouple globally, then natural gas deployment stands to gain 11 considerably from sustained high oil prices (because gas would remain moderately priced, midway 12 between the low and high case levels), whereas the opposite would be true in a low oil price world.
13
While these dynamics may be expected in the directional sense, the magnitude of the swing is 14 arguably quite dramatic. We note, for instance, that in both baseline and mitigation scenarios total assumptions. This is largely explained by gas replacing coal, non-biomass renewables, and nuclear
18
for power generation, along with some substitution of gas for oil and coal in industry and for oil in Our second key insight is that, depending on how the fuel substitution dynamics play out, the . Viewed from these different perspectives, the emission differences 4 brought about by vastly diverging oil price futures are certainly non-trivial; on the other hand, they 5 are quite a bit smaller than the CO2 reductions needed to safely achieve the 2 °C target [30] [31] [32] . What all 6 of this suggests is that global mitigation efforts would be somewhat hampered by sustained low oil 7 prices and somewhat boosted by sustained high prices.
9
That the net CO2 emissions differences between our reference low and high oil price cases are not ). The final insight stemming from our analysis is that if the stringency of global climate policy remains 
36
across a range of carbon price cases.) To be sure, we do not mean to suggest that carbon pricing at 37 less substantial levels is unimportant for mitigating CO2; indeed, our analysis shows that it will be 38 critical, given that such policy instruments specifically target carbon-intensive fossil resources and 39 can thus drive declines in CO2. What our analysis instead highlights is that an extended period of 40 either low or high oil prices would impact both fossil and non-fossil resources at the same time and 41 in different ways; and this could have mixed effects on CO2.
43
Conclusions
44
In summary, by employing the MESSAGE integrated assessment model, this study finds that 1 sustained low or high oil prices could have a major impact on the global energy system over the next 2 several decades; and depending on how the fuel substitution dynamics play out, the carbon dioxide 3 consequences could be significant (e.g., between 5% and 20% of the budget for staying below the 4 internationally-agreed 2 °C target). The variance in the impacts depends on a suite of critical 5 uncertainties, chief among them the future coupling between oil and gas prices going forward.
7
Though not entirely comparable, a recent analysis by the IEA 1 looked at diverging oil price futures 8 where prices slowly return to either high (128 US$/bbl) or mid (85 US$/bbl) levels by 2040. That 9 analysis arrives at findings similar, in the directional sense, as we do: lower oil prices lead to greater 10 cumulative oil and gas demand and lesser renewables and coal demand. In terms of magnitudes, 11 however, the energy demand shifts we estimate (moving from high to low prices) are substantially to be a mere 3 GtCO2 greater in the IEA's mid oil price case, whereas we calculate the increase to be 19 in the range of 50 to 98 GtCO2 (to 2040). Inter-study discrepancies so immense point to deep 20 uncertainties in how critical factors will drive energy system development, and by extension climate 21 change mitigation, over the twenty-first century.
23
A caveat to the analysis described here is that a single model was employed to answer the questions numerous parametric sensitivity analyses that we conduct (i.e., the structural assumptions of 30 models). Another important caveat to our analysis is that it only considers sustained low or high oil 31 prices, whereas the combined dynamics of oil demand and oil field exploration and development 32 will likely ensure that future oil prices are more volatile than the intentionally stylized paths assumed 33 here. Future work might therefore consider studying, for example, the energy and carbon 'lock-in' 34 effects of oil prices that remain low for a time but then rise to much higher levels afterwards (i.e., 'V.5a' of MESSAGE was used for this paper.) At its core is a global energy-economic model based 7 on a linear programming optimization (cost-minimization) approach which is used for medium-to 8 long-term energy system planning and policy analysis 12, 13 . . The following paragraphs focus on the innovative features that were 39 implemented in MESSAGE in order to undertake the analysis described in the current paper.
41
Constructing the low and high oil price cases historical prices relied on the use of "price adjustment factors", which were applied to fuels at both rents/profits and speculation, among other things.
28
Alternative oil price cases were created by lowering or raising the price adjustment factors on oil 29 until the desired price level was reached in 2020 (~40 US$/bbl in the low case, ~110 US$/bbl in the 30 high case). Endogenously determined price dynamics then take over in the years after 2020, so that 31 prices rise gradually in line with more costly grades of oil being consumed. The same is true of 32 natural gas, depending on whether or not its prices were assumed to be coupled to oil; if not 33 coupled, then gas prices remain at a moderate level in between the low/high extremes. In addition,
34
we assumed that year-2020 subsidy rates for oil and gas (on both the supply and demand sides) scale ). Once the subsidy rate is set, it is held constant throughout the time horizon of the 39 model.
41
Modeling the link between crude oil and natural gas prices
42
In the past, oil and gas prices tended to be correlated because (i) crude oil (and refined oil products) 43 and natural gas were competitive substitutes in several energy and industrial sectors, (ii) the two 44 resources were often produced using similar technologies by firms possessing similar expertise, 1 and/or (iii) many gas supply contracts (particularly for liquefied natural gas, LNG) were indexed on 2 oil prices. 42 So when oil prices rose (or declined), gas prices tended to as well, even if their absolute 3 price levels differed considerably. The past several years have shown that these relationships could 4 be undergoing a transition, however. In the United States, for example, oil and gas prices have 5 recently decoupled, owing, at least partly, to hydraulic fracturing techniques for gas production 22 .
6
Price correlation meanwhile remains strong in most of Europe and elsewhere 21, 23 ; though, this too 7 could change over time if the fragmented gas markets of today become more globalized (with LNG 8 being shipped over long distances, as is currently the case with crude oil). The emergence of these 9 new market dynamics is a key uncertainty for the future -hence the sensitivity cases we run for the 10 future coupling between oil and gas prices. In all instances, consistent with past observations 41 , we 11 assumed that subsidy rates for oil and gas (on both the energy supply and demand sides) scale
12
proportionately with their respective prices.
14
Developing climate policy scenarios for the analysis
15
Climate policy, or 'mitigation', scenarios were run by imposing a globally-harmonized carbon price 16 that begins in 2020 and grows with an interest rate of 5%/yr until the end of the century.
17
('Mitigation' meaning that CO2 emissions are reduced below those of the no climate policy baseline.)
18
For instance, the 'reference climate policy' scenario focused upon in this paper assumes a carbon Tables 1 and 2 and Supplementary Figures 1, 3 , and 4.
28
Selecting the sensitivity cases to run
29
The sensitivity cases run for this study are summarized succinctly in Table 1 . We of course recognize Strubegger of IIASA are also recognized for their assistance with model code development.
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